McKaiser’s post-mortem of his debate with John Lennox.
'Luthon64
Disclaimer: I haven’t heard the McKaiser vs Lennox debate, nor seen a transcript thereof. I’m reacting to McKaiser’s article about it to which I provided a link earlier.
McKaiser only touched superficially on Lennox’ argument that his god is still central to our moral reasoning because his god gave us the rational faculties to do so. McKaiser correctly points out that this is a very weak argument because this ostensibly god-given rationality still allows people to reason about morality without ever consulting a god, and so a god remains essentially irrelevant to the task of settling inquiries into morality.
But this isn’t an especially good counterargument either because god could have contrived things in such a way that the rationality s/he supposedly gave us would predispose us towards the “right” choices since reasoning is only ever as good as the tenets on which it is based. That is, it’s rarely the logical processes themselves (i.e., deduction, induction, syllogism, etc.) that are flawed; much more common is a faulty starting point from which an argument proceeds. And so the tenets of morality that underpin arguments about morality are not only the real question, but the origin of those tenets also remains wholly unaddressed by Lennox’ suggestion.
Consequently, if Lennox’ god indeed gave us rationality in part to puzzle out moral questions then that aspect succeeds only in deferring the question of whether a god is required for morality. If rationality, as decreed by a god, subsumes morality then Lennox’ argument is a sidestep by which he merely re-labels “morality” as a subset of “rationality”, and thereby avoids answering the central question.
Suppose now that an astute McKaiser had spotted this equivocation and replied that, okay, so if our moral sense is subsumed under our rational capabilities, the question becomes whether Lennox’ god is necessary for rational morality, and Lennox’ bait-and-switch lies exposed for all to see. If Lennox asserts that his god remains unnecessary for rational morality then he concedes that his god is not necessary for morality, full stop. If on the other hand he asserts that his god is now necessary, he is left with the unenviable problem of explaining the ontology of both rationality and the tenets of morality, as well as the relationship between them, in terms of what his god has supposedly mandated — i.e., Lennox has added one substantial ontological problem and the need for one significant clarifying narrative to his own explanatory burden.
Moreover, the essential difficulty, viz., whether something is good/bad because a god says it is, or whether good/bad exists independently, is still left hanging in the breeze even if we accept Lennox’ rational morality argument. Those who insist a god is necessary for morality, by however circuitous a path, must accept either that their god’s moral edicts are arbitrary, or that there is something greater than their god that grounds absolute morality. The former option is morally unattractive, while the latter seems to push us into some form of incomprehensible regress.
'Luthon64
A goalpost-shifter weighs in: “No, my god isn’t necessary for putting us on the right path,” he says, “S/He’s needed to keep us on it!”
The glaring flaw in the above position is obvious, as is its arrogant presumption.
And so we have yet another breathtaking example of how the believer will invent literally anything, no matter how shifty or banal, when attempting to preserve the illusion.
It’s simply not possible to make any headway into this kind of self-serving intellectual poltroonery and academic treason.
'Luthon64