Lekker man. First you yourself effuse broadly and ignorantly about the quantity of information in digital vs. analog. When the error is pointed out, you just sidestep the inconvenience instead of acknowledging it. That’s just too preciously creationist of you.
That so? There’s no evidence to suggest that these “chemical packets” you speak of are like binary digits or strings. But then you obviously know something no neuroscientist I’ve ever read does.
Um, let’s see now. Prolly 'cos a great many of your replies, usually the least informed ones, are unmistakably geared at undermining what the other says. Maybe it’s just me though.
OK, I will attempt to explain in terms of Information Theory. Information in this sense is quantified by randomness. The more random the data, the harder it is to compress. Any deterministic algorithm run on the data will not increase it’s randomness. For instance, unzipping a file does not increase the quantity of information stored in it.
BTW did you try the experiment I suggested?
Neurons either fire, or they don’t. How can this be analogue communication?
Sorry, I thought the tone of my responses so far was alternately questioning and explanatory.
Really? I don’t think you’ve done all that much yet.
At the risk of moving further off topic… I agree with Peter, the information gained by interpolation might not be zero, but it’s not very useful either. You will have more values and pixels, but not more detail. Their are various interpolation methods of course, some will be more useful that others.
As for neurons being digital - I will stay away from something I know nothing about
The issue isn’t usefulness. If you think so, please define “usefulness” in relation to information. The issue is the amount of information regardless of one’s tastes. If you add an algorithm to interpolate between samples, you have added information whether it’s useful or not.
Yes, you’ll have to excuse us ordinary mortals. We’re just way too slow for the stunningly fleet-minded, breathtakingly xyresic, awesomely perspicacious Mechanist. No, it’s got too many gaping gaps but that’s just what anti-materialists thrive on, isn’t it? Ergo, it must be true, mustn’t it? I mean, who needs a scalpel when you have sledgehammer, right?
As to creationism, it might be possible to convince me that I created the universe just before I woke up this morning, but, unfortunately, I don’t think it’s a belief that would spread.
Then I offer my sincere apologies to the forum generally and Peter in particular for having misread him on that score. I see the knock I handed out has been undone - thanks Mr Admin.
Penrose and Hameroff have argued that the conventional models of a brain function based on neural networks alone cannot account for human consciousness, claiming that quantum-computation elements are also required. Specifically, in their Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR) model [R. Penrose and S. R. Hameroff, J. Conscious. Stud. 2, 99 (1995)], it is postulated that microtubules act as quantum processing units, with individual tubulin dimers forming the computational elements. This model requires that the tubulin is able to switch between alternative conformational states in a coherent manner, and that this process be rapid on the physiological time scale. Here, the biological feasibility of the Orch OR proposal is examined in light of recent experimental studies on microtubule assembly and dynamics. It is shown that the tubulins do not possess essential properties required for the Orch OR proposal, as originally proposed, to hold. Further, we consider also recent progress in the understanding of the long-lived coherent motions in biological systems, a feature critical to Orch OR, and show that no reformation of the proposal based on known physical paradigms could lead to quantum computing within microtubules. Hence, the Orch OR model is not a feasible explanation of the origin of consciousness.
From the conclusion:
The Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR model has attracted much attention and much debate since it was initially proposed in part because it holds the fascinating possibility of quantum mechanical effects playing a central role in cognitive function, and in part because, at least superficially, the model appears physically reasonable. Here we have shown that when tested objectively the basic physical assumptions upon which the Orch OR model depends simply do not hold either from a structural, dynamic or energetic perspective and we hope that with this work we can finally put to rest this intriguing but fundamentally flawed model of cognitive function.
Oh well, there you have it, fundamentally flawed it seems :P.
Would be interesting to see the responses to this article from the protagonists of the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR model proposal not?
