I wonder if that’s really true, though, when some irrational people manage to lose the train of a conversation that is all of, oh, 42 words long, which does call into very serious question whether they are, in fact, conscious…
'Luthon64
Exactly! Thank you, I couldn’t agree more. You make me feel there is some hope left for philosophy after all.
Perhaps, but can an irrational person be said to really be choosing anything at all?
That’s because you evidently haven’t given the time of day to the things I have tried to bring to your attention several times in the past. Here’s the introductory paragraph of the Wikipedia entry on free will:
You will perhaps recall that I have given a number of good and sound reasons, drawn from a variety of hard scientific disciplines, for why hard determinism is untenable and why it is likely to remain so. In case it’s still not obvious, the Wikipedia citation above states it clearly: “The opposing positions … are metaphysical libertarianism … thus that free will exists; and hard determinism … thus that free will does not exist.” Now, if hard determinism is false, at least some degree of metaphysical libertarianism necessarily exists.
'Luthon64
And I have not argued the point. There are lots of examples of indeterminacy, we are lucky to have what determinacy we do have. Without it making choices would be impossible, they would just be random.
No, I’m sorry, one cannot just say determinism is false therefore “free will”. One might as well say determinism is false therefore faeries, or God.
;D ;D ;D You gotta love the inconsistencies.
Maybe you should first make a proper effort to comprehend how the argument coheres. Then perhaps you’d care to put together an argument for at least two millennia’s worth of philosophers who have argued exactly that. It’s no good simply brushing aside what I have cited from Wikipedia, given its central importance to the question, especially when the sum total of your own position is screeds of material cited from a [i]single/i source. Besides, it would make a most welcome change from the one-liner pseudo-pithy flat dismissals that we’ve been treated to so far, which, incidentally, do you no favours. You like to think of yourself as a sceptic (you have asserted as much), yet I see very little in the way of sceptical engagement, only a willingness to ride roughshod over profound difficulties with your stance when such difficulties are pointed out, and, based on ample prior instances of the same, I’ve little doubt that you’ll try to cook up some facile sub-twelve-word ruse rather than engage the essential point. “No, I’m sorry, one cannot…” is not an argument when you utterly fail to motivate it. That much at least should be self-evident to a sceptic.
EDIT: So, to reiterate the gist of it: “Now, if hard determinism is false, at least some degree of metaphysical libertarianism necessarily exists.” In terms, then, of the Wikipedia’s “opposing positions” on the question, the falsity of hard determinism necessarily implies the proper existence of at least some free will.
Only if non sequiturs are your stock-in-trade.
'Luthon64
But your version doesn’t follow logically. Without indeterminacy how could anything be random?
You seem to believe that if hard determinism is true then “free will” cannot exist. I’m not going to argue with this statement because compatibilism seems even sillier to me, but how does showing that hard determinism is false prove that we necessarily have any “free will”?
If it could be shown conclusively that one does not have “free will”, by say a computer program which predicted one’s every action, would this somehow prove hard determinism to be true?
If D is true then F is false
D is False
Therefore F is true?
What’s this, a form of denying the antecedent?
I see. Well, amidst my suspicions there remained a faint hope, but now I’m completely convinced.
'Luthon64
Just spotted this edit. Well, since both positions are obviously wrong there needs to be another position one can take.
Here they are, just a bit further down the page:
Other viewsSome philosophers’ views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. John Locke, for example, denied that the phrase “free will” made any sense (compare with theological noncognitivism, a similar stance on the existence of God). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to postpone a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: “…the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose”.[35] Similarly, David Hume discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely “verbal” issue. He also suggested that it might be accounted for by “a false sensation or seeming experience” (a velleity), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.[36]
Arthur Schopenhauer put the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in these terms:
Everyone believes himself a priori to be perfectly free, even in his individual actions, and thinks that at every moment he can commence another manner of life. ... But a posteriori, through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but subjected to necessity, that in spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it, he must carry out the very character which he himself condemns...[37]In his On the Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer stated, “You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing.”[38]
Rudolf Steiner, who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer’s work,[39] wrote The Philosophy of Freedom, which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: freedom of thought and freedom of action. He argues that inner freedom is achieved when we bridge the gap between our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, and our thoughts, which give us access to the inner nature of the world. Outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with moral imagination. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united.[40]
The contemporary philosopher Galen Strawson agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem.[41] He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation “S”, one must have been responsible for the way one was at “S-1”. To be responsible for the way one was at “S-1”, one must have been responsible for the way one was at “S-2”, and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states ex nihilo. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view “pessimism” but it can be classified as hard incompatibilism.[41]
Ted Honderich holds the view that “determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false” and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are abstract entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if determinism is true, incompatibilists have not, and cannot, provide an adequate account of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The “new” problem is how to resolve this conflict.[42]
Can you construct a coherent argument please? The above is just slippery gibberish.
Yes, I do.
Because it necessarily entails some non-zero minimum of metaphysical libertarianism! Do us all a favour and study the contending positions on this question. If you want to have a meaningful debate on an issue, do your opponent the minimal courtesy of knowing at least the basics of what you are talking about.
“Prove,” as in render completely certain? No, of course not, but if you were to supply such a program, it would lend considerable support to the idea that hard determinism is true. Good luck with that, though, especially once the simulated person becomes aware of it and fathoms the algorithm (assuming that behaviour is even algorithmic). Does the computer predict correctly, irrespective of whether the person is aware of the simulation or can the simulated person deliberately, even perversely, thwart the computer’s predictions? Your view is in trouble regardless of whether behaviour is algorithmic or not because if it isn’t, such a program is not achievable and if it is, it’s predictions are circumventable by simple virtue of the fact that the simulated person, knowing the predicted course, is free to do something different.
Can you construct a coherent argument please? The above is just inconsequent babble predicated on a very shallow understanding of the competing arguments, on top of which denying the antecedent is a perfectly valid modus in the propositional calculus when dealing with logical biconditionals.
Now I’m thoroughly confused (no, in reality I’m not, just amazed at the stretchings). What particular variety of non-free will are you actually defending? You brazenly claim, without any supporting argument or evidence whatsoever and against the overwhelming majority of philosophical thought, that “both [hard determinism and metaphysical libertarianism] are obviously wrong.” Fine, so all those thinkers are and were deluded. In itself, that puts you in some exclusive company, but note that Hume, Locke, Schopenhauer and Steiner are not actually in your no-free-will club at all – they merely contested, for various reasons, the usual understanding of the term. None of them rejected free will, unequivocally or otherwise. Hume, in case you were wondering, advocated a compatibilist position.
Once more, please be so kind as to defend your view that “both are obviously wrong” with something more than three six-word sentences that beggar all reason. Nothing against brevity, mind you, just this aversion I have to Clever Dick posturings.
'Luthon64
Well, I said:
Without determinism making choices would be impossible, they would just be random.
To which you responded:
Without indeterminism making choices would be impossible, they would just be random.
The first statement makes sense, the second doesn’t. I’m not making an argument, just pointing this out.
Why?
No it doesn’t. It necessarily entails some non-zero minimum of indeterminacy, but this could just be random.
I have done so repeatedly. There are problems with hard determinism and libertarianism, as there are with compatibilism and incompatibilsm
I think such an experiment would have to be double blind. I don’t think it would really be possible to build such a computer, I was just using it as an example of the backwards reasoning that metaphysical libertarianism seems to employ.
So are you now saying that if and only if hard determinism is true then “free will” cannot exist?
Will respond to the rest later.
Don’t bother. If you’re flatly going to ignore what I have asked of you then there’s no point in continuing this conversation.
'Luthon64
You provided more than sufficient evidence that hard determinism is flawed, even though I never argued for hard determinism. I think I have shown that metaphysical libertarianism is based on a flaw in logic. I’m still not sure why you think we are dealing with logical biconditionals (if and only if).
Not surprising since they’ve been arguing for thousands of years and still haven’t reached a conclusion yet.
Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. John Locke, for example, denied that the phrase "free will" made any sense (compare with theological noncognitivism, a similar stance on the existence of God). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to postpone a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose".[35] Similarly, David Hume discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He also suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a velleity), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.[36]
What have I ignored? What can I do to get you to engage with the points I have made?
Here are some questions I would really appreciate you answering:
What exactly do you mean by “free will” and how would one test for it?
Why are you an incompatibilist?
Do you believe that if and only if hard determinism is true then “free will” cannot exist?
If so, why the biconditional?
You’re starting to sound like TeleoPhroners. Ugh.
That’s going too far, now I feel insulted. 
I must say this entire argument with Mefi embodies what I dislike most about philosophy. Being told I have to argue either for compatibilism or incompatibilism and for hard determinism or libertarianism. What if I think they are all nonsense?
I wonder, did Hume ever actually say he was a compatibilist? He does call the debate “a mere verbal issue”. Are others prejudging what I say to necessarily fall into one of these two categories? I will state again for the record: I don’t think “free will” is necessarily compatible or incompatible with anything, I have no pre-conceived opinions about “free will” because I have yet to be convinced that it exists or even could possibly exist.
I have another question relating to “free will” from the Wiki link:
Both of these positions, which agree that causal determination is the relevant factor in the question of free will, are classed as incompatibilists. Those who deny that determinism is relevant are classified as compatibilists, and offer various alternative explanations of what constraints are relevant, such as physical constraints (e.g. chains or imprisonment), social constraints (e.g. threat of punishment or censure), or psychological constraints (e.g. compulsions or phobias).
Why are all those who deny that determinism is necessarily relevant called compatibilists? It seems to me that this larger group would consist of two smaller groups: compatibilists, who like their name says look for ways to adjust their meaning of “free will” to fit reality, and those who have yet to be convinced that there are any relevant factors at all relating to “free will”.
From one of the sources of the Wiki article:
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT6
The facts are clear, and they have been known for a long time. When it comes to the metaphysics of free will, André Gide's remark is apt: 'Everything has been said before, but since nobody listens we have to keep going back and beginning all over again.' It seems that the only freedom that we can have is compatibilist freedom. If - since - that is not enough for ultimate responsibility, we cannot have ultimate responsibility. The only alternative to this conclusion is to appeal to God and mystery - this in order to back up the claim that something that appears to be provably impossible is not only possible but actual.The debate continues; some have thought that philosophy ought to move on. There is little reason to expect that it will do so, as each new generation arises bearing philosophers gripped by the conviction that they can have ultimate responsibility. Would it be a good thing if philosophy did move on, or if we became more clear- headed about the topic of free will than we are? It is hard to say
Seems I must be a pessimist or hard incompatibilist, “free will” is absurd.
Here’s some more from the same site:
These anti-compatibilists or incompatibilists divide into two groups: the libertarians and the no-freedom theorists or pessimists about free will and moral responsibility. The libertarians think that the compatibilist account of freedom can be improved on. They hold (1) that we do have free will, (2) that free will is not compatible with determinism, and (3) that determinism is therefore false. But they face an extremely difficult task: they have to show how indeterminism (the falsity of determinism) can help with free will and, in particular, with moral responsibility.The pessimists or no-freedom theorists do not think that this can be shown. They agree with the libertarians that the compatibilist account of free will is inadequate, but they do not think it can be improved on. They agree that free will is not compatible with determinism, but deny that indeterminism can help to make us (or anyone else) free. They believe that free will, of the sort that is necessary for genuine moral responsibility, is provably impossible.
The pessimists about free will grant what everyone must: that there is a clear and important compatibilist sense in which we can be free agents (we can be free, when unconstrained, to choose and to do what we want or think best, given how we are). But they insist that this compatibilist sense of freedom is not enough: it does not give us what we want, in the way of free will; nor does it give us what we believe we have. And it is not as if the compatibilists have missed something. The truth is that nothing can give us what we (think we) want, or what we ordinarily think we have. All attempts to furnish a stronger notion of free will fail. We cannot be morally responsible, in the absolute, buck-stopping way in which we often unreflectively think we are. We cannot have ‘strong’ free will of the kind that we would need to have, in order to be morally responsible in this way.