Nor can you choose to want chicken or choose to stop wanting sushi.
I replied yes because I view the word “will” as being the key to the problem here. If I will to make a decision, that’s the decision I will make. However, my will may still be the causal result of various stimuli. Hence I don’t think I define this phenomena the same as others. I do think that the answer is, not totally, no. It’s confusing yes, but I do believe that parts of our will are determinable. It is the I that makes the choice. And since the I has defined characteristics, it’s choices are guided by those. An introvert may want to talk to that girl but refrain from doing it because he’s an introvert. He is “free” to go talk to her, but his definition of I skews him towards not doing it.
EDIT: But, it is still his will being carried out, hence he does have free will.
Poor guy, if only he could stop wanting to be more confident.
And this, even if true, answers my question how, exactly?
And this, even if true, detracts from my point how, exactly?
'Luthon64
I like that.
I have a list of six books that I wish to buy with more-or-less equal urgency but my budget permits the purchase of only two of them. To say that the two titles I did buy were determined by prior causes is an empty [i]post hoc[/i] statement unless you can show in advance (without my knowledge or involvement if need be) precisely those causes you believe will precipitate the exact choice that I will make because that is what determinism actually entails.There are so many factors in play though, your personality, your disposition on the day and at the time, the cover and position of the books in question, the (slight) imbalance in preference for the books. etc etc etc
I gather that you are saying if all these factors are known to me (or omniscient pabi for instance) I’d still not be able to pre-determine your choice?
this doesn’t mean that there are no causes that point towards a particular choice or limit the available choices; it means only that the choice is not completely fixed by those causes and that I still exercise some autonomy over where my selection will fall, even in spite of those causes.But the causes does play a role. The choice or choices aren't really 'free' from them?
It is merely a response to your ad hominum characterisation of free will skeptics as passive and not proactive. Perhaps this cartoon I found on PZs blog will help explain:
Well, in your defence of:
2 : freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention
you seem to be focussing on external causes and ignoring the internal causes which determine our choices.
Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. It is why I spent the better part of a paragraph explaining in broad strokes the reasons why such Laplacian determinism doesn’t hold water. As for “omniscient pabi,” who knows? Omniscience breeds a whole new batch of philosophical maggots.
I have never argued that the causes don’t play a role, even a significant one, only that they alone don’t necessarily fix any given choice. In fact, if you go back and examine what I have written here, you will see that I argue strongly against unconstrained free will. It seems to me that we’re still stuck on the same essential semantic issue.
I still utterly fail to see the relevance of libertarianism, cartoon notwithstanding. Please explain how you get from what I wrote to it being an “ad hominem characterisation.” If you feel personally maligned by my earlier suggestion re passivity, then rest assured that it was meant purely as a possible point of interest.
I am? Really? I think you must be reading a different set of posts to those that I have submitted.
'Luthon64
Does a random element to decision making mean that the will is free, or does that just make it randomly constrained?
An element of randomness in and of itself seems plainly insufficient to provide a coherent account of free will. But I make no such claim. For that we will need a much better account of mind and consciousness, as I have said before. However, a random element loosens or even breaks completely the grip of the clutches of determinism on the choice-making process, determinism being the polar alternative to free will. It should not be hard to see that randomness can potentially effect a broadening of the choice base, both in terms of the number and availability of choices themselves, and also in terms of the process by which a selection is made.
Chaotic dynamical systems are effectively non-deterministic precisely because there is interplay among subtle random factors, finely-balanced sensitivities, and broad rule-like constraints and principles. But “non-deterministic” should not be confused with “haphazard” or “arbitrary” or “disordered” or somesuch. Chaotic dynamical systems in many cases still exhibit broad-based systematic patterning and evolution, but these can only be anticipated probabilistically in terms of “motions” (more accurately, point-to-point transitions) in the many-dimensional phase space describing a specific instance of such a system. The human brain is certainly complex and interconnected enough to constitute, in many of its possible states, a chaotic dynamical system.
'Luthon64
I guess I struggle to see how anything “constrained” can be deemed “free”…
It seems to me that we’re still stuck on the same essential semantic issue.I suspect you are right.
A bird in the open is still constrained beyond a certain point, not least by its own “birdness.” It can’t, for example, build its nest at the bottom of the Marianas Trench, or fly off to Jupiter. Yet I think very few of us would hesitate to describe an uncaged bird in the wild as “free.”
'Luthon64
A bird in free flight would epitome freedom indeed.
I’m just not sure when one considers this on a deeper, philosophical level that one can ascribe ‘free’ so easily. And I don’t know whether I really care to either way.
Look, is this ultimately a philosophical question and what impact does it have on any one? I believe I make choices, including coming to work this morning when it really wasn’t a choice but a necessity.
As I have said, I don’t really care whether I have free will or not, and I don’t see how, if I accepted that I have free will, it will change anything. For me it has always been a fairly meaningless concept and the only times I come across it is when I raise the problem of evil and I get free will thrown in my face as if it answers anything.
There is, to me, a compelling practical aspect that it would be foolish to ignore. If you disallow that a person has free will, you strip them of their autonomy. From there, it’s but a short hop to absolving them of accountability. As a sceptic, I feel duty bound to hold people accountable for any unsustainable beliefs they hold and, more properly, the actions that flow from them.
As an “answer” to the Problem of Evil, it really sucks. That should be obvious to anyone who thinks about it for half a minute. There are evils in the world that are incompatible with free will coupled to a loving, omni-everything god (Alvin Plantinga’s contrived and overwrought nonsense notwithstanding). It takes a sick and/or desperate mind (or it requires a sick god or sick demonic minions of one) to cook up a free-will defence for annual miscarriages numbering in the tens of millions globally. Or for millions of AIDS orphans. Or any number of other tribulations affecting innocent people that bring the Epicurean dilemma to the fore. Thus, the hijacking of free will into a defence for evil in the world is in my view a not-very-good reason for rejecting it.
'Luthon64
It certainly seemed as if you were trying to discredit free will skeptics instead of free will skepticism:
Since when does a thing’s existence depend on how one feels about it?
Oh I found it interesting, you can rest assured of that.
Are internal causes, as opposed to external ones, then somehow compatible with free will in your opinion and would such compatible causes include genetic predispositions?
Like hurricanes? Guess that’s why we give them names.
Accountable how? If you want to hold them morally, legally or conversationally accountable there are other ways to do so. It is only ultimate accountability for which “free will” is required.
Yes! Birds, like people, don’t need “free will” to be free in any important sense.
BTW for anyone who had difficulty reading the cartoon, I’ve replaced it with a less blurry image.
It certainly seems as if you’re too desperately charged and sensitive over the issue.
Wow! Please do me the courtesy of citing where exactly I argued this bit of fiction.
Causes are causes and, within appropriate circumstances, causal, be they “internal” or “external.” How do you propose to separate the two? And predispositions are just that: predispositions. That is, they need not be binding. Had you paid attention, it should be clear enough that my view entails predispositions and causes being compatible with free will for the very simple reason that neither fixedly determines the outcome of a selection exercise. I have given several reasons, derived from an assortment of scientific disciplines, for my view. In the meantime – and I’m sorry to have to point this out – your “arguments” have so far consisted of little more than glib six-word snippets and inconsequential obfuscatory irrelevancies that boil down to, “No! No! No! I simply won’t have any of it!” And please stop avoiding my questions. Either acknowledge your error or your lack of knowledge.
And this apparent non sequitur is relevant exactly how? Or addresses precisely what?
In that their actions arose from an impetus that they exercised at least some control over. But what are these “other ways” that justify holding people “morally, legally or conversationally accountable” for their actions?
And what exactly is this “ultimate accountability?”
I argued that? Where, exactly?
'Luthon64
Yawn… ???
I thought I was being more proactive. I admit I am somewhat concerned by this “free will” idea and it’s effects on people.
I don’t.
I got that bit, still don’t see how that gives us “free will”.
All you have argued for is some degree of indeterminism, which I have agreed with. You have not provided any convincing reason to call this “free will”.
I did say I was going to try to avoid getting too involved in this thread, but if you have any specific questions I will try to answer them.
Well, there are many examples of chaotic dynamical systems to which we do not attribute “free will”. I just though it was rather endearing the way we give hurricanes names.
There’s stacks in Steven Pinker’s book, and lots on the Naturalism site as well. Admittedly it’s a bit more complicated that the simplistic “free will” explanation. Do we really have to go into all of it now? Briefly, the arguments mainly involve practicality and normativity.
The idea that people somehow deserve to be punished, rather than that is sometimes unfortunately necessary.
It’s my response to the example you gave: Yes, I agree the bird is free and I therefore conclude that “free will” is not a prerequisite for freedom in any useful sense.
Okay, so we’re down to quote-mining, then. You conveniently neglected the part where I wrote (emphasis added), “In light of the present lack of persuasive argument either for or against free will, the decision as to whether it properly exists is ultimately an emotional one…” What part of the leading caveat is confusing you?
Why, nor do I! So why contrive this “Are internal causes, as opposed to external ones, then somehow compatible with free will…” and this “you seem to be focussing on external causes and ignoring the internal causes which determine our choices” distinction?
I think you need to be more attentive when reading what others write. Where, exactly, did I argue that it did?
I have consistently argued that we lack coherent accounts of mind and consciousness, ingredients that appear to be essential to a proper understanding of will, free or otherwise. I have also consistently argued that randomness thwarts strict determinism, the diametrical opposite of free will. In case it’s still not clear enough, my position was, is and, for now, remains that a stance which denies free will raises questions that are at least as hard to answer satisfactorily as does the converse position. At this point, you have advanced nothing that persuades me otherwise. So where, please, have I said that indeterminism equates to free will?
Please point out where I generically attribute free will to chaotic dynamical systems.
Please feel free to enlighten me with the appropriate broad-strokes arguments. After all, I have done so in the opposite direction. Otherwise I might be tempted simply to dismiss such claims as so much hot air.
So, “ultimate accountability” is distinguished from ordinary accountability in that the former is properly justified while the latter is a matter of necessity or expediency. I see. Actually, I don’t. On what basis do you make this, um, startlingly artificial motivating distinction? How can accountability be “necessary” if, according to you, there can be no effective wilful leeway pro or contra it?
And I have argued that it is so exactly where?
'Luthon64
“The criminal argues to the judge that he is not responsible for his crimes as he is but a product of his genes and his environment and that he had no choice in doing what he did. The judge responds that he is but a product of his genes and environment and that he thus has no other choice but to find the criminal guilty and sentence him to 20 years hard labor”
I’m just saying.
I have consistently argued that we lack coherent accounts of mind and consciousness, ingredients that appear to be essential to a proper understanding of will, free or otherwiseI sure lack the understanding and I remain happy with my position of "unsure". Truly if there was an option for "don't care", I'd change it to that.
Because the very act of punishing some people for criminal acts deters others from committing those same acts. Not everyone will be deterred by punishment though, so a small percentage will always need to be punished. The tricky part is making the punishment severe enough to deter most people without being too severe on those who wouldn’t have been by deterred by any kind of punishment anyway.
Ah, I see I’ve been punished for my skepticism yet again. 