I too voted “Yes.” While a naturalist/materialist metaphysic in its current incarnation seems to require a denial of free will (and I think no one who has thought about it for just a second will refute that it’s a deeply tricky problem), it would be premature to reject free will, given people’s ubiquitous recoiling from the idea that they are not autonomous agents. What possible purpose can be served by such a pervasive illusion if free will is indeed a fantasy? What do we gain from it?
Such a rejection is furthermore premature since there is, as yet, no satisfactory naturalist/materialist account of consciousness and mind, things on which free will depends. Lacking such accounts, we don’t reject mind and consciousness because doing so would be self-contradictory. Moreover, those who hold with strict determinism have not been paying attention to the lessons of QM, Mensuration, Computation and Chaos Theory. These areas of study provide compelling reasons to suppose that strict determinism (as Laplace had conceived it) is a chimera. This is not to deny that many processes are deterministic within certain limits of accuracy. However, there are many other processes that evolve over time to vastly different states from initial conditions that are only marginally different. All that is needed is some subtle natural effect to predispose such very sensitive initial conditions this way rather than that, and determinism flies out the window. The argument that “given sufficiently accurate knowledge, etc., it’s still deterministic” is soundly refuted by a bunch of insurmountable physical limitations on what can be known, what can be measured and what can be computed.
Personally, I am certain that there are as-yet undiscovered features of physical reality (space, time, matter, energy) that will permit an in-principle materialist/naturalist account of how mind and consciousness arise from mindless and unconscious space-time-matter-energy without having to resort to many of the strange arguments, either slippery, self-serving or non sequitur, that this problem has produced. Further, I am sure that these aspects are tied in with QM indeterminacy and non-locality. Once we understand mind and consciousness more clearly as manifestations of underlying material properties, we will no doubt also have a clearer picture of what it means to have a will, how a will can procure physical effects (e.g. making a cup of coffee, or not), and whether such a will can indeed be free.
Needless to say, the history of science is replete with examples where a material account of this or that phenomenon was held to be “impossible” only to be turned on its head later on. More pessimistically, it may also be that the as-yet-undiscovered features of physical reality that I speak of will lie forever beyond our ability to apprehend if they form the basis on which our mind, consciousness and will are founded. Presently, we simply don’t know.
In short, those who argue that materialism/naturalism undeniably requires a rejection of mind/consciousness/free will are getting way ahead of themselves and what inferences are actually warranted from what we presently know. Nonetheless, until the question is properly settled, I will remain convinced that my will really is free for the very simple reason, as it seems to me, that were it not so, consciousness itself, and self-awareness in particular, would be pretty pointless attributes to have.
'Luthon64